This paper investigates economic convergence in real income per capita between 27 European Union countries. We employ a non-linear latent factor framework to study transitional behavior among economies between 1970 and 2010. Our results offer important insights on the economic catch-up exhibited by the new EU members in light of the institutional changes and macroeconomic adjustment processes undertaken over the last 40 years. Our main findings suggest no overall real income per capita convergence in the EU, however, we identify subgroups that converge to different steady states using an iterative testing procedure. Regional linkages play a significant role in determining the formation of convergence clubs. The empirical evidence suggests a clear separation between the new and old EU member states in the long run.
The most widely applied concepts, originating with Baumol (1986) , Barro and Sala-iMartin (1992) , and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) , are those of β-convergence, understood as a tendency of poorer economies to grow faster than rich ones, and σ-convergence, which refers to a reduction of income dispersion between rich and poor countries; typically after controlling for a country's saving and population growth in which case we are talking about conditional convergence as opposed to unconditional convergence. Finally, the existing approaches also differ in their focus on whether economies grow at the same rate in the steady state (relative convergence) vs. whether they converge to the same steady-state income level (absolute convergence). Most empirical methods fall under two categories: cross-section augmented Solow regressions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Mankiw et al., 1992) and time series tests of unit root and cointegration (e.g., Evans and Karras, 1996; Evans, 1998; Siklos, 2010; Kutan and Yigit, 2005; Guetat and Serranito, 2007; Lopez and Papell, 2012) . For an overview of the empirical techniques and their potential drawbacks, see Bernard and Durlauf (1996) , Binder and Pesaran (1999) , and Islam (2003) . This paper investigates whether European economic integration has been accompanied by convergence in per capita real income among old and new members of the EU between 1970 and 2010, in light of the institutional reforms and macroeconomic adjustment processes that took place during the last few decades. In quest for an answer, we test for convergence in a comprehensive sample including all 27 members of the enlarged EU, and we use a non-linear factor model proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007a, b, 2009 ), which considers a form of panel convergence comparable to the concept of conditional σ-convergence. This approach has several appealing features. From a theoretical point of view, it does not rely on homogeneous technological progress across countries and over time, a limiting assumption widely used in the existing literature. Another considerable advantage of the technique is that, unlike other time series methodologies, it does not require the existence of common stochastic trends, and therefore allows individual transition paths to be transitionally divergent. In addition, it provides an empirical framework to distinguish between (i) convergence to a single steady state shared by all economies as predicted by the neoclassical growth model, (ii) overall divergence, and (iii) club convergence, which may be interpreted as convergence to multiple steady-state equilibria (see Galor, 1996) . Convergence clubs can be identified within the panels under study based on a clustering algorithm developed by Phillips and Sul (2007b) . Moreover, the factor model measures both the speed and degree of convergence, which allows us to empirically discriminate between relative and absolute convergence. Finally, Phillips and Sul (2007b) provide a method to trace the transition path of an economy toward the steady-state; hence, we can analyze the diverse shapes of economic transition, including transitional divergence followed by catching-up and convergence.
The relatively new empirical framework enables us to provide important insights on the evolution of transition behavior exhibited by the old and new EU member states.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. There is no overall real income per capita convergence in the EU-27, and we identify subgroups that converge to different steadystate equilibria. This is a central result, as it highlights that the hypothesis of a "multispeed" Europe prevails nearly a decade after the eastern enlargement.
2 We do not find a clear relation between clustering and EMU membership in that euro area countries do not form a single convergence club. Instead, convergence clubs are formed mainly on the basis of geographic region, and a separation is found between post-communist economies and the old EU members in the long run. The CEEC showed remarkable developments through the implementation of several policies facilitating European cohesion. However, our results reveal that the pace of economic growth was insufficient to narrow the GDP per capita differences compared to Western economies. Moreover, we observe a gradual setback of Mediterranean countries, resulting in a South-East vs. North-West division of European economies by the mid-nineties. Hence, we may conclude that country-specific structural disparities within the European Union will continue to pose further challenges in achieving real per capita income convergence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature on economic convergence in the EU. Section 3 offers a brief description of the methodological framework, while the data used in the analysis is presented in Section 4.
The main empirical results are contained in Section 5, and finally, Section 6 summarizes our conclusions.
Related literature
There is a large body of empirical studies on macroeconomic convergence in Europe. 3 A variety of different methods as well as sample periods have been previously considered, 2 The concept of a "multi-speed" Europe refers to differentiated integration between countries. Proponents of this idea argue that different members of the European Union should integrate at different levels and pace, depending on the economic and structural characteristics of each country (see, e.g., Alesina and Grilli, 1993; Stubb, 1996) .
3 In our literature review we focus on papers that analyze real income per capita convergence in Europe. However, there is also a burgeoning literature that we do not survey here, which investigates the nominal effects of the common currency area (see, e.g., Goldberg and Verboven, 2005; Rogers, 2007; Siklos, 2010; Ehrmann, Fratzscher, Gürkaynak, and Swanson, 2011; Lopez and Papell, 2012; Fischer, 2012) . and the literature has so far led to mixed conclusions, the issue of real income convergence among European countries remains thus highly controversial. One strand of the literature analyzes convergence at the regional level. For example, in an early paper, Quah (1996) argues that European regions cannot be viewed in isolation, instead physical location and geographical spillovers account for a considerable amount of regional income distribution dynamics. In a related paper, Sala-i-Martin (1996) analyzes β-and σ-convergence in real income per capita for 90 regions spanning eight European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) between . He finds that regional incomes converge at a speed of two percent per year, which is about 5-6 percentage points lower than the speed predicted by the neoclassical growth model, concluding that parameterizations of the model used by economists are inconsistent with the observed evidence. More recently, Canova (2004) finds separation into convergence clubs along the North-South, rich-poor dimension between 1980-1992, using a predictive density approach and data on NUTS2 Western European regions. Similarly, Corrado, Martin, and Weeks (2005) find no overall convergence in per capita real income within the EU-15 plus Norway before the foundation of the EMU. They use time series methods on NUTS1 data between 1975-1999, and show that geographical location as well as socio-demographic characteristics are highly correlated with the formation of convergence clubs. Ramajo, Marquez, Hewings, and Salinas (2008) apply spatial econometric methods to estimate the speed of convergence for a sample of 163 EU regions over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . Their results provide further evidence in support of separate spatial convergence clubs, where the regions in the EU cohesion-fund countries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain) are found to converge faster than the rest of the regions.
The aggregate macroeconomic evidence has likewise led to mixed results. Carvalho and Harvey (2005) fit a multivariate structural time series model on real income per capita of 11 euro area countries from 1950 to 1997. They distinguish between two possible convergence clubs, a high-income group (five core economies, Austria, and Finland) and a low-income group (Spain, Greece, and Portugal) that converge in a relative sense. In addition, they find that Ireland diverges from the rest of the countries, following its own growth path. Crespo Cuaresma, Ritzberger-Grünwald, and Silgoner (2008) assess β-convergence in per capita real GDP between 1960-1998 for the EU-15 and show that EU membership significantly improves the degree of economic integration and long-term growth. They further argue that the positive effect of EU membership on growth is relatively higher for poorer countries. Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2006) In a series of papers, Kutan and Yigit (2004 , 2007 and Brada, Kutan, and Zhou (2005) analyze convergence in industrial output, prices, monetary aggregates and nominal and real interest rate spreads for the EU-15 and the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004. Yigit (2004, 2005) Our paper is most closely related to a handful of recent works that study economic convergence in Western Europe using the factor model proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007b) .
The model has been applied by Bartkowska and Riedl (2012) to test for convergence in per capita income for 206 regions in 17 Western European countries from 1990 to 2002. They detect six separate clubs on the regional level and show that starting conditions, such as the initial level of human capital and per capita income, are significant determinants of a region's club membership, while structural characteristics play a relatively minor role.
Further, Fritsche and Kuzin (2011) use the same procedure to assess price level, unit labor cost, real per capita income, and productivity convergence for 12 members of the euro area, Denmark, Sweden, and the UK between 1960-2006. They provide evidence for club convergence, where geographic distance as well as differences in economic development may contribute to subgroup formation.
Methodology

Theoretical framework
Let y it represent period t log per capita real income in country i (where i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T ). In the neoclassical growth model homogeneous technology is assumed, so that regardless of their initial conditions, all countries undergo technological progress at the same rate over time. This condition is overly restrictive, and it fails to account for the cross-country income heterogeneity observed in the data. Several papers, including Parente and Prescott (1994) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) , Basu and Weil (1998) , and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) have proposed variants of the neoclassical growth model with endogenous technological progress, which differs across countries and over time, such that the transition path of each economy toward the steady state level of per capita real income depends on country-specific technological growth rates.
Following Parente and Prescott (1994) , Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) , and Phillips and Sul (2007b) , the neoclassical growth model augmented with technological heterogeneity yields the following expression for log per capita real income:
where y i0 and y * i are the initial and steady-state levels of log per capita income, respectively, β it is the time-varying speed of convergence rate, and a it is the log of technology accumulation for economy i at time t. Technology can be decomposed as a it = a i0 + γ it a t , into initial technology accumulation a i0 and the distance of country i from publicly available advanced technology at time t, γ it a t . The parameter that measures this distance, γ it , varies over time and across countries. Under the assumption that advanced technology a t evolves according to a common trend µ t , the growth model with heterogeneous technology admits a time-varying latent factor representation which can be expressed as:
see Phillips and Sul (2007b) . The factor µ t is a common steady-state trend function which may follow either a non-stationary stochastic trend with drift or a trend-stationary process, and the country-specific transition path of country i to the common trend µ t is captured by the time-varying loadings δ it , which absorb any idiosyncratic movements in y it . The loadings represent a form of economic distance of each economy from the common trend, which may arise from differences in technological progress. Therefore, the extent to which individual country characteristics differ across economies will be reflected in the diverse shapes of economic transition encompassed in δ it . As proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007b) , the loadings are assumed to follow a semiparametric process of the form:
where the idiosyncratic terms ξ it are i.i.d.(0, 1) across i but weakly dependent over t.
The loadings δ it converge slowly to the constant δ i as t → ∞ for α ≥ 0, and scaling by the slowly varying function log(t) ensures a smooth transition path. Relative income differentials between economies i and j can be written as:
Thus, the convergence of all N economies to the common trend µ t requires that δ it and δ jt converge to some common constant δ i = δ j = δ as t → ∞ for i, j = 1, 2, ..., N and i = j, which implies that country-specific differences are eliminated over the long run.
The parameter α in Equation 3 represents the rate at which cross-sectional heterogeneity decays to zero over time, that is, the speed of convergence.
We are interested in testing the hypothesis of convergence between all countries (overall convergence), against the alternative of no convergence for some country or countries. The alternative hypothesis includes divergence of all countries in the panel (overall divergence), or a situation in which sub-panels converge to different steady states with possibly some diverging units (club convergence). Our null hypothesis can be expressed as
or equivalently δ i = δ for all i and α ≥ 0. The alternative hypothesis is given by
which corresponds to one of two cases, either overall divergence: δ i = δ for all i with α < 0; or club convergence: δ i = δ for some i with α ≥ 0, or α < 0.
The log(t) convergence test
The identification and estimation of the factor loadings δ it is not feasible without imposing additional structure and assumptions on the dynamic latent factor model. However, an equally suitable way to extract information about δ it required to test the hypotheses of interest is offered by constructing the following relative transition paths:
which measure the loadings δ it in relation to the panel average at time t, while removing the common steady-state trend µ t (Phillips and Sul, 2007b) . The variable h it traces out an individual transition path over time for economy i in relation to the panel average. If the factor loadings δ it converge to δ, the relative transition paths given by h it converge to unity. In that case, the cross-sectional variance of h it converges to zero asymptotically:
where H t measures the distance of economy i from the common limit. The statistical convergence property H t → 0 translates into the null hypothesis of economic convergence between countries in the panel. If convergence fails to hold, the distance remains positive as t goes to infinity. Phillips and Sul (2007b) propose a test for economic convergence based on the asymptotic convergence property given in Equation 6. This involves estimating the following regression by ordinary least squares:
where t = [rT ], [rT ] + 1, . . . , T , for some fraction r > 0. 4 The regression coefficient b provides a scaled estimator of the speed of convergence parameter α, specifically b = 2α. 5 Thus, the null hypothesis of convergence can be tested by a one-sided t-test of the inequality α ≥ 0 using the estimateb and a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard error. The null hypothesis is rejected at 95% significance level if tb < −1.65. When the rejection of the null applies, a clustering procedure is performed, in which the log(t) test is repeated in an iterative manner in order to detect all possible subgroups in the panel, based on a set of criteria (see Appendix A for details). If no additional clubs are found, one may conclude that the remaining countries diverge.
Analyzing economic convergence within this framework has several appealing features.
First, convergence is treated as an asymptotic property. Hence, the model is consistent with a wide range of transition dynamics toward the steady state. Different countries may follow substantially different relative transition paths outlined by h it , including periods of transitional divergence and heterogeneity, yet convergence ultimately occurs when Equation 6 holds in the long-run. Second, we can distinguish empirically between absolute (level) and relative (growth rate) convergence. In particular, if the estimateb ≥ 2 and accordinglyα ≥ 1, this implies absolute convergence within the panel. However, 0 ≤b < 2 indicates only relative convergence, that is, convergence of growth rates over time.
6 Finally, we do not have to rely on any particular assumptions regarding the deterministic or stochastic trending behavior of y it and µ t .
Data
We investigate convergence between the 27 members of the European Union. Hence, the In what follows, we assess some elementary time series properties of the data, focusing our attention on characterizing the long-run behavior. First, we take a look at a few stylized facts in order to build some intuition on the economic performance of EU countries since the 1970s. In the sequel, we turn to a more formal econometric approach to shed further light on the nature of the data.
6 Notice that µ t follows either a stochastic trend with drift or a trend-stationary process, both of which diverge at an O p (t) rate as t goes to infinity. Hence, if δ it converges at a faster rate than O p (t) to the constant δ (as determined by the convergence speed α), then relative convergence implies absolute convergence, however, if δ it converges at a slower rate than O p (t), then relative convergence holds while absolute convergence does not.
Stylized facts
Our empirical approach hinges upon the idea that European economies differ substantially in terms of the technology used in the production process. Recent studies of total factor productivity (TFP) for the EU-27 show that differences in per capita income between new an old EU members reflect to a large extent differences in aggregate TFP (see Burda and Severgnini, 2009; Marrocu, Paci, and Usai, 2012) . According to Marrocu et al. (2012) , the technological heterogeneity observed in the EU stems from differences in the production structure and the level and scope of sectoral specialization between Western Europe and the CEEC. They show that over the last decade, the old EU members have specialized their production in knowledge-intensive services and gradually outsourced a large portion of their low-tech manufacturing to the new accession countries. This process is associated with significant differences in TFP levels and growth rates between European countries. be, however, substantial heterogeneity over the period considered. While some countries experienced relatively high mean rates of real per capita GDP growth, such as Malta, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, and Romania (4.3%, 3.3%, 2.9%, and 2.9%, respectively), most highly developed countries (e.g., Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden) have been growing at a slower rate on average (around 1.5-1.6%). These figures suggest an economic catchingup of the relatively poorer countries, and it illustrates a somewhat idiosyncratic path in the case of Luxembourg. Disregarding the high growth countries in the plot reveals another interesting pattern: while log real income per person varied between around 8.7 and 9.9 in 1970, it narrowed down to an interval between approximately 9.7-10.6 by 2010, which hints at a reduction in income dispersion from the initial period. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of cross-sectional real income dispersion over time, it thus reflects a notion of σ-convergence. For each year, we compute the sample standard deviation of log real GDP per capita across countries, and we take 5-year rolling averages to smooth out any short-run patterns. while dispersion seems unaffected by the foundation of the monetary union. Regarding the CEEC, the socialist economic system lost its impetus by the 1980s, and these countries were faced with rising debt and severe austerity measures. Hence, in the early 1990s, important political and institutional changes were undertaken, involving sizable macroeconomic adjustment processes, e.g., transition from planned to market economy, liberalization of prices, and privatization of state assets. These developments are in line with the dispersion dynamics observed.
Panel unit root tests
Next, we test for the presence of stochastic trends in real per capita income. From a statistical perspective, the presence of a -stochastic or deterministic -trend in the data is an important assumption underlying the non-linear factor model proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007b) . Moreover, evidence for a unit root in the panel also has economic implications. Notably, in the standard Solow (1956) growth model, each economy converges to its unique balanced growth path and any country-specific deviation from the steady state is eventually eliminated. Consequently, deviations of each variable from the average across economies (y it −ȳ t ) should follow a stationary process (see Evans and Karras, 1996) .
8 Therefore, panel tests for a unit root in y it −ȳ t have been widely applied to assess economic convergence in the literature, see e.g. Evans and Karras (1996) , Evans (1998), Kutan and Yigit (2005) , Guetat and Serranito (2007) , and Lopez and Papell (2012) .
8 If this process is mean zero, there is level convergence between economies, otherwise each economy will converge to its own parallel growth path, i.e., convergence will occur between growth rates. Given the differences in economic structure and development between our sample countries, we employ two panel unit root tests which are suitable for the analysis of dynamic heterogeneous panels. The first test, proposed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) , is based on pooled univariate augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions, with the null hypothesis of a unit root in the panel (no overall economic convergence), against the alternative of stationarity of at least one series (at least one economy converges to the cross-sectional averageȳ t ). In contrast, the second test, developed by Hadri (2000) , has stationarity (overall economic convergence) under the null hypothesis. In addition to considering convergence with respect to the cross-sectional average, we follow Kutan and Yigit (2005) by testing for convergence to a benchmark country, and we opt for Germany as the economy that reflects core EU standards. The test regressions may generally contain an intercept and linear time trend. We include country-specific constants in order to allow for the possibility of relative convergence, consistent with Evans and Karras (1996) .
Besides, we consider a deterministic trend under the stationarity hypothesis in line with the non-linear factor model, such that the hypothesis of trend-stationarity is tested against stochastic non-stationarity. The lag length in the ADF regressions is chosen based on the Schwartz information criterion. Table 2 reports the test results. In summary, the unit root tests lead to an unanimous rejection of overall economic convergence within the EU-27. This result is robust to the choice of the benchmark as well as the employed test statistic. Nevertheless, the presence of stochastic trends in the panel does not necessarily imply that all economies are on diverging growth paths, since the tests do not rule out a situation in which one or more subgroups of countries converge to the respective subgroup-average, while others diverge. Moreover, when technological progress varies over time and in the cross-section, convergence may fail to hold even in the absence of stochastic trends in the data as shown by Phillips and Sul (2009) . In the next section we present results from the log(t) approach that tackles precisely these issues.
Empirical results
Applying the log(t) convergence test and clustering algorithm to real per capita income, we uncover the following key facts:
There is no overall real income per capita convergence in the European Union.
The null hypothesis of convergence is clearly rejected in all panels considered. However, we do find subgroups that converge to different steady states.
Fact 2. We provide strong evidence of relative convergence within each of the subgroups, which highlights that a "multi-speed" Europe is currently an economic reality. 
Convergence and clustering
Looking at the empirical results in detail, we consider convergence in two baseline panels.
These are real GDP per capita for the EU-21 sample for 1970-2010 ("long panel") and for the EU-27 sample for 1995-2010 ("short panel").
9 In addition, we investigate the EU-21
between 1995-2010 in order to confirm the robustness of our findings in the absence of the six countries that are missing from the EU-21 sample, namely, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The convergence club classification results are reported in Table 3 . 10 Moreover, Figure 3 depicts the corresponding relative transition curves of individual countries (ĥ it ) and the average transition curves for each club (h clubt ). Recall that the relative transition path h it measures the departure of each country i from the panel average. If the factor loadings δ it converge to a common constant δ, the transition paths h it converge to unity. Other than that, the economic transition behavior can significantly differ across economies.
The null hypothesis of overall economic convergence is rejected at the 5% level in all three panels. Concerning the long panel, we identify four clubs and only one diverging country. Luxembourg shows distinct growth dynamics, being on a transition path permanently above all other countries during the period in question (see Figure 3/ Regarding our analysis for the EU-27 (and EU-21) sample for 1995-2010, only relative convergence is detected, which points to the transitional nature of the period considered, 10 Several recessions occurred during the period under study, such as the first and second oil crisis of the 1970s, the ERM crisis of the 1990s and the global financial and economic crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] , which are captured in the cyclical component of the series. Yet, our objective is to describe the long-run evolution of the time series, while isolating dynamics at all other frequencies. Thus, we present empirical results from log(t) regressions performed on time series filtered for business cycle fluctuations with the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter as suggested by Phillips and Sul (2007b) . Filtering the data may have an impact on the empirical results and the choice of the business cycle filter is debatable. Therefore, we performed a series of robustness checks, including estimation on the raw series and on series filtered by a band-pass filter, and our main results have remained unchanged in that we have obtained similar club classification outcomes regardless of the applied technique. In addition, the transition paths estimated from the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series retain a smooth, economically meaningful pattern, which constitutes a clear advantage compared to other methods. 1995-2010 and 1970-2010 . Countries in bold are absent from the EU-21 sample (these are Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The table contains the speed of convergence (α), the corresponding coefficient estimates (b) and t-statistics. Newey-West standard errors are given in parentheses. The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% level if tb < −1.65. 
Patterns of economic transition
European countries introduced several policies with the aim of achieving economic integration, including the liberalization of goods, capital, and labor markets, harmonization of tax policy, and the foundation of the EMU. Empirical studies have shown that stronger integration promotes catching-up and convergence in the long run (see, e.g., Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2008) . Our results provide statistical evidence that the process of European economic integration is yet unfinished, in that EU countries do not converge to the same real per capita income level. In this subsection, we examine the evolution of convergence and clustering in a subsample analysis, and we illustrate the typical patterns of economic transition in the EU over the last 40 years. Our aim is to determine whether there is a potential for relatively poorer economies to reduce the gap with wealthier countries (and vice versa), and to identify the transition paths along which this catching-up can be achieved over time. , and for the EU-27 between 2000-2010. On balance, the clustering patterns in the subsamples resemble important similarities with our baseline club classifications, and therefore they confirm the robustness of our main results. The differences between convergence and clustering in each subsample and the longer baseline panel come from the fact that income dispersion was relatively high at the initial period and has significantly reduced by the end of the century. Consequently, economies that converge over the period from 1970 till 2010 do not necessarily form the same cluster when considering panels that begin at a more recent date (i.e., 1980, 1990, and 2000) . Table 4 also reveals some evidence on the underlying transition across clubs over time.
In particular, club 1 from the long panel of Such trajectories include (i) relative transition paths that converge to unity from an either high or low state of departure, (ii) an initial period of divergence (labeled transition phase A) followed by a catch-up phase (phase B) and later convergence (phase C), and (iii) divergence from the panel toward a state below (h iT < 1) or above (h iT > 1) unity. This period was also marked by the transformation into an export-orientated economy and well-functioning markets for goods and services (European Commission, 2008) .
Other examples of type (i) transition include Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, while Finland, Greece, Italy, Spain, and the UK are good examples of type (ii) transition. Furthermore, the transition dynamics of the CEEC are of the second type as well. According to Figure 3 , each of these countries were simultaneously on diverging transition paths by the 1980s, -indicating the decline of the socialist economic system -which was followed by a notable catch-up as result of the macroeconomic adjustment processes that started in the nineties. Finally, Luxembourg is an obvious type (iii) country, i.e., diverging throughout the entire sample period.
In this paper we have analyzed convergence of real income per capita in a comprehensive sample including all 27 members of the enlarged EU. We have applied a novel panel convergence methodology to study the evolution of transitional behavior of economies driven by country-specific technological progress between 1970 and 2010. The most appealing feature of this econometric framework is that it allows for heterogeneity and transitional divergence of individual transition paths.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First of all, there is no overall real per capita income convergence in the EU. This result is robust to any time horizon considered. Instead, we detect subgroups that converge to different steady-state equilibria. We provide strong evidence in support of relative convergence but little evidence of absolute convergence within each cluster, pointing to the transitional nature of the period under analysis. Economic development and regional linkages seem to play a significant role in determining the formation of convergence clubs. Yet, eurozone countries belong to distinct subgroups, thus clustering is not necessarily related to EMU membership. Moreover, there is a clear separation between the CEEC and the old EU members in the long run, suggesting that, even though the CEEC have exhibited higher real income growth than the EU average over the last 40 years, catching up was not sufficient in order to eliminate cross-country real income per capita differences. Finally, we observe a South-East vs.
North-West division of European economies by the mid-nineties.
Our results draw attention to the lack of growth-enhancing structural reforms in EU countries, posing a threat to the achievement of real convergence in the near future.
Moreover, despite the fact that the CEEC economies went through profound changes starting from the early nineties, indicating some degree of convergence toward the West, policymakers should consider the persistent differences documented in this paper in the light of further enlargement of the European Union.
A Clustering algorithm
To identify convergence clubs we use the following clustering algorithm proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007b) :
Step 1 Last observation ordering: order the N countries in the panel according to the last observation y iT .
Step 2 Core group formation: form all possible subgroups G k by selecting the first k highest units for 2 ≤ k < N . Run the log t regression to obtain the test statistic tb for each subgroup k. Define the core group of size k * by maximizing tb subject to min tb > −1.65. If the condition min tb > −1.65 does not hold for k = 2, drop the first country in the panel and repeat the same procedure for the rest.
Continue until a subsequent pair of units is detected with tb > −1.65 and a core group G * k can be formed. If no such pair is found then conclude that there are no convergence clubs in the panel. In addition, note that if k * = N all units converge.
Step 3 Sieve individuals for club membership: after the core group is detected, add one of the remaining units at a time and run the log t regression for each. Include the unit in the subgroup if the corresponding test statistic tb is greater than some critical value c * . 13 Once all units satisfying the sieve criterion are added, run the log t test for the subgroup. If tb > −1.65, a convergence club is formed, otherwise raise the critical value c * -to increase the degree of conservativeness of the test -and repeat the procedure until tb > −1.65 for the entire group. Then conclude that the group constitutes a convergence club. If no remaining units can be sieved to the initial core group, the group itself constitutes a club.
Step 4 Recursion and stopping rule: form a second group from all countries that could not be sieved in Step 3 and run the log t test again. If the whole group converges, i.e. tb > −1.65, conclude that there are two convergence clubs in the panel. If not,
repeat Steps 1-3 on the same group to determine whether there are any smaller subgroups that form convergence clusters. If no other clubs can be detected, conclude that the remaining countries diverge.
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